{"id":2781,"date":"2024-04-23T13:33:58","date_gmt":"2024-04-23T13:33:58","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/healthrights.mk\/?p=2781"},"modified":"2024-04-23T13:33:58","modified_gmt":"2024-04-23T13:33:58","slug":"why-young-men-women-seem-to-be-drifting-apart","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/healthrights.mk\/?p=2781","title":{"rendered":"Why Young Men &#038; Women Seem to Be Drifting Apart"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"alignnone size-full wp-image-2782\" src=\"https:\/\/healthrights.mk\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/04\/Why-Young-Men-and-Women-Seem.jpg\" alt=\"\" width=\"469\" height=\"262\" srcset=\"https:\/\/healthrights.mk\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/04\/Why-Young-Men-and-Women-Seem.jpg 469w, https:\/\/healthrights.mk\/wp-content\/uploads\/2024\/04\/Why-Young-Men-and-Women-Seem-300x168.jpg 300w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 469px) 100vw, 469px\" \/><\/p>\n<p>illustration: louise zergaeng pomeroy<\/p>\n<p>The Economist: <a href=\"https:\/\/www.economist.com\/international\/2024\/03\/13\/why-the-growing-gulf-between-young-men-and-women\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Why young men and women are drifting apart (economist.com)<\/a><\/p>\n<p>Diverging worldviews could affect politics, families and more<\/p>\n<p>Mar 13th 2024|atlanta, beijing and warsaw<\/p>\n<p>SaveShare<\/p>\n<p>Give<\/p>\n<p>Listen to this story.\u00a0Enjoy more audio and podcasts on\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/economist-app.onelink.me\/d2eC\/bed1b25\">iOS<\/a>\u00a0or\u00a0<a href=\"https:\/\/economist-app.onelink.me\/d2eC\/7f3c199\">Android<\/a>.<\/p>\n<p>In a trendy\u00a0food market in Warsaw, Poland\u2019s capital, two female engineers are discussing how hard it is to meet a nice, enlightened man. Paulina Nasilowska got a big pay rise a few years ago. Her boyfriend asked: \u201cDid you have an affair with your boss?\u201d He is now an ex-boyfriend.<\/p>\n<p>Ms Nasilowska\u2019s friend, Joanna Walczak, recalls a man she met on Tinder who revealed that he was a \u201cred-pill\u201d guy (a reference to \u201cThe Matrix\u201d, a film, meaning someone who sees reality clearly. In the \u201cmanosphere\u201d, a global online community of angry men, it means realising that men are oppressed.) He thought household chores and child care were women\u2019s work, and that women could not be leaders. They didn\u2019t have a second date.<\/p>\n<p>Typically for young Polish women, Ms Nasilowska and Ms Walczak support parties of the liberal left, which take women\u2019s issues seriously and promise to legalise abortion. Young Polish men, they complain, hew more to the right, or even to the far right. Consider last year\u2019s election. Then the top choice for 18- to 29-year-old men was Confederation, a party that touts free-market economics and traditional social values. (\u201cAgainst feminists. In defence of real women\u201d is one of its slogans.) Some 26% of young men backed it; only 6% of their female peers did.<\/p>\n<p>Young Polish men have their own set of complaints. Feminism has gone too far, say two firemen in their 20s in a small town. Lukasz says he used to be able to go to a village dance party and \u201cthe women there were wife material.\u201d Nowadays \u201cthey\u2019re all posting shameless pictures of themselves on social media,\u201d he laments. The media are \u201call biased and pushing the culture to the left\u201d, complains Mateusz (neither man would give a surname). People no longer admit that men and women often want to do different kinds of work.<\/p>\n<p>In much of the developed world, the attitudes of young men and women are polarising.\u00a0<em>The Economist<\/em>\u00a0analysed polling data from 20 rich countries, using the European Social Survey, America\u2019s General Social Survey and the Korean Social Survey. Two decades ago there was little difference between men and women aged 18-29 on a self-reported scale of 1-10 from very liberal to very conservative. But our analysis found that by 2020 the gap was 0.75 (see chart 1 ). For context, this is roughly twice the size of the gap in opinion between people with and without a degree in the same year.<\/p>\n<p>Put another way, in 2020 young men were only slightly more likely to describe themselves as liberal than conservative, with a gap of just two percentage points. Young women, however, were much more likely to lean to the left than the right, with a gap of a massive 27 percentage points.<\/p>\n<p>In all the large countries we examined, young men were more conservative than young women (see chart 2). In Poland the gap was 1.1 points on a scale of 1-10. It was a hefty 1.4 in America, 1 in France, 0.75 in Italy, 0.71 in Britain and 0.74 in South Korea. Men and women have always seen the world differently. What is striking, though, is that a gulf in political opinions has opened up, as younger women are becoming sharply more liberal while their male peers are not.<\/p>\n<p>For young women, the triumphs of previous generations of feminists, in vastly increasing women\u2019s opportunities in the workplace and public life, are in the past. They are concerned with continuing injustices, from male violence to draconian abortion laws (in some countries) and gaps in pay to women shouldering a disproportionate share of housework and child care. Plenty of men are broadly in their corner. But a substantial portion are vocally not. Young women\u2019s avid liberalism may spring from a feeling that there is much work still to be done, and that opposition to doing it will be stiff.<\/p>\n<p>The gap does not translate straightforwardly into voting patterns, but it is visible. One poll found that 72% of young American women who voted in House elections in 2022 backed the Democratic candidate; some 54% of young men did. In 2008 there was barely any gap. In Europe, where many elections offer a wide array of parties, young women are more likely to support the most left-wing ones, whereas young men are more likely to favour the right or even the radical right.<\/p>\n<p>In France in 2022 young men were much keener than young women on Eric Zemmour, a presidential candidate who wrote a book rebutting Simone de Beauvoir, France\u2019s best-known feminist. Germany\u2019s election in 2021 saw the largest ever left-right gap between the votes of young women and men, according to Ansgar Hudde of the University of Cologne. In Portugal, where the far-right Chega party surged in an election on March 10th, support for it is concentrated among voters who are young, male and less educated. And South Korea in 2022 elected an overtly anti-feminist president; more than 58% of men in their 20s voted for him. Some 58% of women in their 20s backed his rival.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Young and cranky<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>The attitude gap between the sexes is also visible in how they view each other. People in 27 European countries were asked whether they agreed that \u201cadvancing women\u2019s and girls\u2019 rights has gone too far because it threatens men\u2019s and boys\u2019 opportunities.\u201d Unsurprisingly, men were more likely to concur than women. Notably, though, young men were more anti-feminist than older men, contradicting the popular notion that each generation is more liberal than the previous one. Gefjon Off, Nicholas Charron and Amy Alexander of Gothenburg University use a Dutch analogy to illustrate the difference between young (18-29) and old (65+) European men. It is as great, on this question, as the gap between the average supporter of Geert Wilders\u2019s radical-right Party for Freedom and the Liberal Democrats.<\/p>\n<p>A similar pattern holds in other advanced countries. Although a higher share of young British men think it is harder to be a woman than a man than think the opposite (35% to 26%), they are likelier than old British men to say it is harder to be a man than a woman. Young British women are more likely than their mothers to believe the opposite. Nearly 80% of South Korean men in their 20s say that men are discriminated against. Barely 30% of men over 60 agree, making their views indistinguishable from those of women in their 20s or 60s.<\/p>\n<p>In China pollsters do not ask about voting intentions, but they find a similar divergence between young men and women when it comes to gender roles (see chart 3). Yue Qian of the University of British Columbia and Jiaxing Li of the Shanghai University of Medicine and Health Sciences looked at survey data for 35,000 Chinese people. In their analysis they found that young men were much more likely than young women to agree with statements such as \u201cmen should put career first, whereas women should put family first\u201d and \u201cwhen the economy is bad, female employees should be fired first.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Young Chinese men\u2019s views were not much different from those of older men, whereas young women\u2019s views were far more egalitarian than their mothers\u2019. Claire, a market researcher in Beijing (who uses an English name to preserve her anonymity), says she wants a partner who will treat her as an equal and share the housework. \u201cI think most Chinese men would fail that test,\u201d she sighs. Dr Qian notes that when Chinese parents go to \u201cmatchmaking corners\u201d in parks, they brag about their sons\u2019 jobs and degrees, but hide their daughters\u2019 achievements, fearing they will put off potential suitors.<\/p>\n<p>What is going on? The most likely causes of this growing division are education (young men are getting less of it than young women), experience (advanced countries have become less sexist, and men and women experience this differently) and echo chambers (social media aggravate polarisation). Also, in democracies, many politicians on the right are deftly stoking young male grievances, while many on the left barely acknowledge that young men have real problems.<\/p>\n<p>But they do, starting with education. Although the men at the top are doing fine, many of the rest are struggling. In rich countries, 28% of boys but only 18% of girls fail to reach the minimum level of reading proficiency as defined by\u00a0pisa, which tests high-school students. And women have overtaken men at university (see chart 4). In the\u00a0eu, the share of men aged 25 to 34 with tertiary degrees rose from 21% to 35% between 2002 and 2020. For women it rose faster, from 25% to 46%. In America, the gap is about the same: ten percentage points more young women than men earn a bachelor\u2019s degree.<\/p>\n<p>Differences in education lead to differences in attitude: people who attend college are more likely to absorb a liberal, egalitarian outlook. The education gap also leads to differences in how men and women experience life, work and romance. To simplify: when a woman leaves university in a rich country, she is likely to find a white-collar job and be able to support herself. But when she enters the dating market (assuming she is heterosexual), she finds that, because there are many more female graduates than male ones, the supply of liberal, educated men does not match demand. Charelle Lewis, a 26-year-old health-care worker in Washington,\u00a0dc, complains that men her age have \u201ca little-boy mindset\u201d.<\/p>\n<p>The dating scene can also be bleak for men who did not go to university. Upwardly mobile women reject them. Michal Pazura, a young Polish dairy farmer, takes a break from inflating tractor tyres and recalls a girlfriend who \u201cdidn\u2019t like the smell\u201d of the farm and left him to live in a town. \u201cI wanted a traditional, stable lifestyle. She wanted fun.\u201d Male farmers have such a hard time finding spouses that a reality show called \u201cFarmer Wants a Wife\u201d is one of the most popular on Polish television. \u201cIt\u2019s hard to say what young women want in a man these days,\u201d says Lukasz, the Polish fireman. Previously, they just wanted a man with \u201ca stable income, who could fix things in the house\u2026and who had a driving licence\u201d, he recalls.<\/p>\n<p>Will the gulf in attitudes affect how many of today\u2019s young people eventually couple up and have kids? It is too soon to know. But for those who think the rich world\u2019s tumbling birth rates are a problem, the early signs are discouraging. In America, Daniel Cox, Kelsey Eyre Hammond and Kyle Gray of the Survey Centre on American Life find that Generation Z (typically defined as those born between the late 1990s and early 2000s) have their first romantic relationship years later than did Millennials (born between 1980 and the late 1990s) or Generation X (born in the decade or so to 1980), and are more likely to feel lonely. Also, Gen Z\u00a0women, unlike older women, are dramatically more likely than their male peers to describe themselves as\u00a0lgbt\u00a0(31% to 16%). It remains to be seen whether this mismatch will last, and if so, how it will affect the formation of families in the future.<\/p>\n<p>The backlash against feminism may be especially strong among young men because they are the ones who feel most threatened by women\u2019s progress. Better jobs for women need not mean worse ones for men\u2014but many men think it does. Older men are less bothered, since they are more likely to be established in their careers or retired. Younger men, by contrast, are just starting out, so they \u201care most likely to perceive women\u2019s competition as a potential threat to their future life course\u201d, argue Dr Off, Dr Charron and Dr Alexander. In a recent study, they found that young European men are especially likely to resent women (and feel that feminism has gone too far) if unemployment has recently risen in their area, and if they perceive their society\u2019s institutions to be unfair. Anti-feminist views, they add, are a fair predictor of right-wing authoritarian ones.<\/p>\n<p>Not all male grumbles are groundless. In some countries, divorce courts tend to favour the mother in child-custody disputes. In others, pension rules are skewed. Men enter the labour market earlier and die younger, but the retirement age for women in rich countries is on average slightly lower. In Poland it is five years lower, so a Polish man can expect to work three times longer than he will live post-retirement, while for a Polish woman the ratio is 1.4, notes Micha\u0142 Gulczy\u0144ski of Bocconi University. This strikes many men as unfair. Mateusz, the Polish fireman, recalls when a left-wing lawmaker was asked, if she was so keen on equal rights, what about equalising the pension age? \u201cShe changed the subject,\u201d he scoffs.<\/p>\n<p>Another factor that particularly affects young men is conscription. They are the first to be called up; women are often exempt. In South Korea, where military service is universal for men and notoriously gruelling, it fuels male resentment. In Europe conscription is no longer common, but Russia\u2019s invasion of Ukraine has made young men in neighbouring countries, such as Poland, more scared they may be drafted, says Mr Gulczy\u0144ski.<\/p>\n<p>Social media, the lens through which young people increasingly view the world, may have aggravated polarisation. First, they let people form echo chambers. When homogenous groups of like-minded people discuss an issue, they tend to become more extreme, as individuals vie for affirmation by restating the in-group\u2019s core position in ever-stronger terms, and denouncing those who dispute it.<\/p>\n<p>When groups of frustrated young men link up online, the conversation often descends into misogyny. In male-dominated Chinese chatrooms the phrase \u201cfeminist whore\u201d is common, along with a pun that inserts the character for \u201cfist\u201d into \u201cfeminist\u201d to make it sound more aggressive.<\/p>\n<p>Once a man joins an angry online group, the pressure to remain in it is strong. Benjamin, a student in Washington,\u00a0dc, says he used to be a \u201cred-pill guy \u2026working as a janitor, eating McDonalds and wallowing in self-pity\u201d. He\u2019d watch classes online about how to boost his self-confidence and pick up women. When he quit the manosphere, his friends taunted him as a \u201cblue-pill\u201d (someone fooled by the establishment) or a \u201ccuck\u201d (a weak man).<\/p>\n<p>Second, algorithms hook users with content that terrifies or infuriates, making the world seem both more frightening and more unjust than it is. Women who click on #MeToo stories will see more of them; ditto for men who click on stories of men being falsely accused of rape. Each may gain an exaggerated idea of the risks that they personally face.<\/p>\n<p>\u201cWhen you go into a gym to work out and a woman\u2019s in your line of vision, you look at her and all of a sudden you\u2019re famous on TikTok for being a sexual harasser or something,\u201d says Kahlil Rose, a 28-year-old conservative man in Atlanta. This has not happened to anyone he knows. But he has seen it on his phone, so it looms large in his consciousness. Benjamin, the student in Washington, offers a similarly gloomy perspective: \u201cMen my age are afraid to get married because they hear a cautionary tale: woman cheats, files for divorce and takes everything he worked for.\u201d<\/p>\n<p>Women see a different world online. Julia Kozik, a student in Warsaw, follows a tip she saw on TikTok. When she rides in a cab, she tears out a strand of hair and puts it under the seat in case she is abducted and the police need\u00a0dna\u00a0evidence. \u201cI avoid men at all costs, mostly,\u201d she says.<\/p>\n<p>The political left has done a fair job of persuading women that it cares about their problems. But it has not figured out how to talk to men, argues Richard Reeves, a liberal scholar, in \u201cOf Boys and Men\u201d. Progressives often assume \u201cthat gender inequality can only run one way, that is, to the disadvantage of women\u201d. And they apply labels like \u201ctoxic masculinity\u201d so indiscriminately as to suggest that there is something intrinsically wrong with being male. Rather than drawing immature boys and men into a dialogue about their behaviour, this \u201cis much more likely to send them to the online manosphere, where they will be reassured they did nothing wrong and that liberals are out to get them\u201d.<\/p>\n<p><strong>Making America virile again<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Some politicians on the right, by contrast, have found ways to connect with disgruntled males. Donald Trump is an obvious example. He cultivates \u201can image of virility and manliness\u201d, argues Mr Cox of the Survey Centre on American Life. He appealed to young men who don\u2019t follow the news by showing up at an Ultimate Fighting Championship event. He also tends \u201cto side with men in cultural conflicts\u201d. In 2018 he decried what he said was a shift in the burden of proof in cases of rape and sexual assault: \u201cIt\u2019s a very scary time for young men in America when you can be guilty of something you may not be guilty of&#8230;That\u2019s one of the very, very bad things that\u2019s taking place right now.\u201d Progressives may dismiss this as the self-interested griping of a serial abuser. But there\u2019s reason to believe that Mr Trump\u2019s macho behaviour \u201cresonates with young men\u201d, says Mr Cox.<\/p>\n<p>What neither side has done well is to tackle the underlying problems that are driving young men and women apart. Most important, policymakers could think harder about making schools work for underperforming boys. Mr Reeves suggests hiring more male teachers, and having boys start school a year later, by default, since they mature more slowly than girls do. Also, since \u201cthe desegregation of the labour market has been almost entirely one-way\u201d, the state could beef up vocational training to prepare young men for occupations they currently shun, such as those involving health, education or administrative tasks. If such reforms help more boys and men adjust to a changing world, that would benefit both men and women.<\/p>\n<p>\u0418\u0437\u0432\u043e\u0440: WUNRN \u2013 03.04.2024<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>illustration: louise zergaeng pomeroy The Economist: Why young men and women are drifting apart (economist.com) Diverging worldviews could affect politics, families and more Mar 13th 2024|atlanta, beijing and warsaw SaveShare Give Listen to this story.\u00a0Enjoy more audio and podcasts on\u00a0iOS\u00a0or\u00a0Android.&hellip;<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":2782,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[],"post_series":[],"class_list":["post-2781","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-vesti","entry","has-media"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/healthrights.mk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2781","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/healthrights.mk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/healthrights.mk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/healthrights.mk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/healthrights.mk\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=2781"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/healthrights.mk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2781\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":2783,"href":"https:\/\/healthrights.mk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2781\/revisions\/2783"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/healthrights.mk\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/2782"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/healthrights.mk\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=2781"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/healthrights.mk\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=2781"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/healthrights.mk\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=2781"},{"taxonomy":"post_series","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/healthrights.mk\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fpost_series&post=2781"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}